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PLAYING WITH THE RULES
Mark V. Tushnet*
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE. By Frederick

Schauer. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 254.
$39.95.

What exactly do rules do? The conventional answer, which Professor Frederick Schauer1 challenges in Playing by the Rules, is: Not
very much. Rules do so little because, while people adopt them to
accomplish something (the "purpose" of the rules), the rules are always either over- or underinclusive with respect to their purposes. A
rule is overinclusive when it directs someone to do something that
does not promote, and might even inhibit, that rule's purposes. Applying an overinclusive rule is inefficient, imposing the costs of complying with the rule yet failing to advance the rule's purposes. 2 If a
transit authority excludes all drug users, including those who use
methadone, from jobs on the subway to promote safety, and it turns
out that the methadone users pose no more risk than anyone else, the
transit authority is raising its own costs of operation without getting
anything in return. 3 A rule is underinclusive when it fails to direct
someone to do something that does promote its purposes. Underinclusive rules are, qua rules, 4 presumptively unfair, because nothing distinguishes the underlying case to which the rule is applied from the one
to which it is not applied. In the previous example, if people with
diabetes happen to pose a greater risk to safety than methadone users,
then excluding the latter from jobs available to the former, in the name
of safety, is unfair.
One's natural reaction, when confronted with a case in which a
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. B.A. 1967, Harvard; J.D. 1971, M.A. 1971,
Yale.-Ed.
1. Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
2. The conventional account of rules takes into account the possibility that applying the rule
in these circumstances might be efficient if the cost of deciding whether or not to apply the rule
exceeds the cost of applying it. This is what Schauer describes as "rules as rules of thumb,'' and
he properly notes that it does not get at the fundamental ruleness of rules.
3. The example is drawn from New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
The analysis gets more complicated, but does not otherwise change, if the authority claims that
its purpose is to promote safety in a cost-justified way.
4. The qualification is necessary because underinclusive rules rarely bar a decisionmaker
from advancing the rule's purpose with respect to someone or something not covered by the rule;
they merely do not require the decisionmaker to do so.
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rule is over- or underinclusive with respect to its purposes, is to ignore
the rule and invoke the purposes directly. Then, however, the rule
does no work at all. It is, as David Lyons has argued in connection
with rule-utilitarianism, extensionally equivalent to its purposes. 5
That is, the rule consists entirely in the invocation of its purposes in
particular cases. At most, the rule is a shorthand guide, a summary of
judgments about what is most likely to advance those purposes. But,
given a rational argument that applying the rule would not advance its
purposes, it will not do for a decisionmaker to say: "Well, the rule
says it applies, and I'm going to apply it without further consideration." Rather, the decisionmaker ought to consider the merits of the
rational argument: if persuaded that applying the rule would not advance its purposes, she ought not apply it.
Schauer argues, against this conventional view, that rules really do
something. The mistaken conventional view, Schauer argues, fails to
distinguish between those who articulate rules and those who apply
them. Schauer concedes the accuracy of the conventional view only if
the very person who has articulated the rule - and who therefore
knows its precise purposes and has full confidence in her own ability to
determine how to advance them - will apply it. But rules are most
often directed from one person to another. And, Schauer argues, if the
rule-articulator, whom I will call Susan, believes that the rule-applier,
whom I will call Sylvester, will less accurately promote the rule's purposes if Sylvester attempts to analyze and apply the rule's purposes
directly than if he simply invokes the rule, the rule will do some work.
As Schauer puts it: "If we do not trust a decision-maker to determine
x, then we can hardly trust that decision-maker to determine that this
is a case in which the reasons for disabling that decisionmaker from
determining x either do not apply or are outweighed" (p. 98).
Rules promote accurate outcomes by preempting Sylvester's inquiry into whether applying the rule would actually advance the rule's
purposes. The inefficiency of overinclusiveness and the unfairness of
underinclusiveness are offset, under this scenario, because Sylvester
will never fail to apply the rule where doing so would in fact although Sylvester believes otherwise - advance the rule's purposes.
Before assessing Schauer's argument, I must enter a disclaimer.
Schauer has written a serious work in the philosophy of law and language, which can most fully be evaluated by specialists in those fields.
Although I am not such a specialist, 6 I can bring to Schauer's work
the perspective of a law professor interested in jurisprudence, and particularly in the implications of jurisprudence for constitutional law.
Although the limitations of my perspective deserve mention, I also
5. DAVID LYONS, TuE FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965).
6. I should also note that I regard myself as one of Schauer's friends, and so may be more
tempered in my judgments, more charitable in my presumptions, than I might otherwise be.
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believe that Schauer's work is likely to be assimilated into mainstream
U.S. law precisely by people like me, rather than by specialists in the
philosophy of law and language. My quibbles, criticisms, and mistakes, therefore, can suggest what the "social" meaning of Schauer's
work might be over the next few years. Further, as befits a writer in
the analytic tradition, Schauer takes great care to be as precise as he
can in his formulations. As a result, it would take an extended analysis and argument to unpack what he has to say about many collateral
points. Fortunately for me, those collateral points do not adhere conceptually to Schauer's central argument about the practice of rule-following, and I believe it appropriate to leave discussion of most of the
collateral points to others.1
.
Schauer's basic argument turns on distinguishing between Susan,
the rule-articulator, and Sylvester, the rule-applier. Two related
problems atjse from that distinction. Schauer argues that rules do
something when Susan, and not Sylvester, can better discern when applying the rule will advance the rule's purposes. 8 In Schauer's core
image, a judge articulates a rule to be applied by a police officer on the
beat. Some police officers might be better than some judges at determining whether the purposes of the constitutional rules limiting police
investigatory techniques would be promoted by refraining from using
one such technique in the circumstances at hand. But, Schauer suggests, the typical officer is more likely than the typical judge to make
errors of over- and underinclusiveness. The typical officer will mistakenly believe in a high probability of discovering a crime in progress,
while the typical judge, knowing that the probability is relatively low,
can state a rule directing the officer to refrain from investigating unless
conditions A, B, and C obtain - conditions that together raise the
probability to a socially acceptable level. As Schauer says, we take a
"worst case" or second-best perspective (pp. 152-53), disabling the
best police officers from exercising their judgment directly so that less
competent officers will, by following the rule, make the right decision
more often. In the aggregate, we get a better fit between actions and
purposes by directing every police officer to follow the rule, although
in parti~ular cases the best police officer would serve us better by exercising independent judgment.
Suppose, however, that Sylvester is actually better than Susan at
figuring out how the rule's purposes will be advanced. The very abstractness of the issues presented to appellate courts, for example,
7. For example, much of chapter 2 clarifies the distinction between descriptive and prescrip·
tive rules, and similarly clarifies the notion of rules as probabilistic descriptive generalizations.
These clarifications are important in some contexts but they are not, I think, central to Schauer's
main argument. Except when engaged in a particular kind of philosophical argument, of a different sort than Schauer's, few people think that legal rules are, in their normative dimension,
descriptive.
8. See, e.g. pp. 149-50.
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might lead judges to overlook relevant information that police officers
have at their fingertips - information that because of their lack of
specialized education, officers are less likely to articulate in terms that
judges find persuasive. 9 Here, two possibilities emerge. First, Susan
may recognize that Sylvester is better than she. She could then adopt
a rule for herself that she will always defer to Sylvester's decisions.
That, however, raises a difficult question. Under what circumstances
does it make sense for a person to make a rule that purports to bind
herself in the future? It makes sense, I think, if Susan (a) is unsure
that she will be able to invoke the rule's purposes directly in the future
(perhaps because she knows that her judgmental capacities will degenerate), and (b) is sure that in the future she would recognize that her
then-contemporary judgments about what would advance the rule's
purposes were less accurate than the judgments to which the rule directs her (that is, that she would recognize that her jµdgmental capacities had degenerated). I am skeptical about the psychological realism
of this picture. to
The other possibility introduces a third character, Loretta the legislator. Loretta knows that Sylvester is better than Susan, and therefore structures Susan's jurisdiction to keep her from making rules
binding on Sylvester. At this point, though, a problem of infinite regress looms. We want to make sure that Loretta allocates jurisdiction
correctly, allowing Susan to make rules where she is better than Sylvester, and denying her jurisdiction where Sylvester is better. But, of
course, the allocation of jurisdiction occurs according to some rule,
too.1 1 As a result, we now have to worry about the problem that arises
when Susan is better than Loretta at :figuring out when invoking Susan's jurisdiction will promote the purposes of the rules.
The problem of jurisdiction may not be serious in light of
Schauer's limited purposes. At the outset of the book, he describes his
analysis as deliberately "unrealistic" (p. vii). I take that to mean that
the analysis tries to define a set of conditions that would make "playing by the rules" a coherent practice. Schauer's conditions for coherence are these: (a) Susan is better than Sylvester with respect to
questions over which she has jririsdiction; (b) Loretta is better than
Susan with respect to questions of allocating jurisdiction; (c) and so
on ad infinitum. Nothing in this argument requires that those condi9. I merely note that a certain degree of elitism seems essential to Schauer's argument, beyond even the hierarchy of rule-articulator and rule-applier that it obviously requires.
10. Schauer discusses this intertemporal problem in connection with the issue of precedent
(pp. 182-87), and in connection with institutions that persist over time with changing personnel
(pp. 172-74). The discussion of precedent, posing the problem as it arises for Susan at time 2,
does not, I think, fully address the problem that faces Susan at time 1. The discussion of institutions, while astute, of course does not deal with the psychology of rule-formulation by
individuals.
11. Schauer uses the term jurisdiction-apportioning to describe rules. See, e.g., p. 98.
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tions ever obtain, and indeed Schauer often inserts qualifications
strongly suggesting that, in his view, the domain in which "playing by
the rules" is a coherent practice is quite limited. 12 Further, nothing in
the argument requires that anybody ever be able to tell whether or not
the conditions obtain, which is why the infinite regress is not a problem for the argument.
Still, I am bound to wonder about the practical significance of
Schauer's argument. 13 Once again I find it useful to put the question
in terms of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rules typically allocate decisions to institutions - courts, police departments, prosecutors' offices,
legislatures - rather than to individuals. And, while I am confident
that some individuals are better than others at determining whether
applying a rule will advance or impede the rule's purposes, I seriously
doubt whether we can make any systematic judgments about institutions. I for one am not confident that judges, taken as a group, are
better than police officers or, perhaps more important, police chiefs again, taken as a group - at striking the proper balance between my
right to be protected against depredations by marauding individuals
and my right to be protected against depredations by marauding police
officers.
My lack of confidence occurs because each job requires its holder
to have a number of talents: the ability to make sound judgments after
reflection ("applying the law"), the ability to make sound decisions
quickly ("preserving order"), the ability to discern the reality of events
beneath the words people use to describe them ("finding facts"), and
many others. Some people are better than others along all these
dimensions, but we have no reason to believe that the processes by
which people are selected for different jobs ensure that only those better along all dimensions occupy the superior positions. Some judges
are better than some police chiefs, but some police chiefs are better
than some judges.
Further, the situations in which people are called on to make decisions are so various that we have no reason to believe that the talents
we measure as a basis for deciding who ought to occupy different jobs
really do very well to identify those who will make the best decisions
about the cases they are asked to decide. Police chiefs probably are
better than judges in setting guidelines about high-speed car chases;
judges probably are better than police chiefs in setting guidelines about
using battering rams to get into "drug houses." And, unfortunately, I
doubt that we really know whether most rules deal with situations
12. See, e.g., p. 179 ("the aspirations of the common law tend away from ruleness").
13. Schauer expresses the "hope" that his analysis can be "returned to its more realistic
home ... in such a way that the analysis may then help those who study decision-making in
greater breadth." P. vii.
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more like car chases or more like battering rams.14
The general point follows. Suppose that the distribution of skill in
applying rules solely in light of their purposes is roughly the same
within every potential rule-applying institution. Then, playing by the
rules would not be a coherent practice: Susan might be better than
Sylvester, but all the Susans taken together would not be better than
all the Sylvesters taken together. Of course, to find out whether this
was true would require an empirical inquiry of the sort that Schauer
abjures. 15
Schauer makes a secondary argument, one that almost inverts the
first insofar as it requires that he deny that two groups like the Susans
and the Sylvesters are different. The problem this argument addresses
is: How does it come about that Sylvester actually is constrained by
the rule Susan has laid down? Sylvester may follow the rule because
he is subject to the exercise of social power; if Susan concludes that he
failed to follow the rule, he will be fired. Then, however, Sylvester is
not constrained by the rule; he is constrained by social power. 16 For
the rule to constrain, it must have what Schauer calls semantic autonomy - "the ability of symbols ... to carry meaning independent of
the communicative goals on particular occasions of the users of those
symbols" (p. 55).
Clearly, to complete the argument, Schauer must establish that semantic autonomy is not derived from social power. 17 At this point my
amateur status disables me from offering more than a modest comment. Consider the possibility that the meaning of words is stabilized
within communities that are constituted by the exercise of social
power. 18 Within such communities, words have the relevant sort of
semantic autonomy, and rules (appear to) constrain, but the true
source of constraint is the social power that constitutes the community.19 Schauer marches up to, and then away from, discussing this
14. I am fairly sure that class-based elitism affects the judgment prevalent among law professors that judges, taken as a whole, are better along most dimensions than police officers or police
chiefs. See also supra note 9.
15. One might ask for a common-sense judgment about the distribution of skills. For what
it's worth, my sense of things is that police chiefs have a slight advantage over judges with
respect to the skills relevant to issues of law, order, and civil liberties. Of course, framing the
inquiry in terms of common sense simply invites us to consider the social sources of common
sense.
16. I believe that the argument against Schauer is strongest in its "social power" version, but
similar arguments could be constructed by someone who offered some other nonlinguistic source
of constraint.
17. Or, again, from some other nonlinguistic source.
18. For my argument to hold, these communities must be linguistic: social power must define the language that community members use. For a discussion of Schauer's response to one
version of this claim, see infra note 20.
19. For an analysis that is, I believe, consistent with the lines of argument developed here, see
Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY.
823 (1991).
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possibility.20
Schauer does show that the "social power" argument cannot be
conducted on the level of individuals, but that, presumably, should go
without saying. He may have been misled by a common rhetorical
style, echoed in this review, of personalizing more general arguments
(Susan and Sylvester, for example) rather than discussing - to be
crude about it - the ruling class and the working class. Of course the
question of social power, or nonlinguistic sources of semantic autonomy, arises only in connection with Susans and Sylvesters taken as
aggregates.
In two footnotes, Schauer notices the problem, but recasts it in a
way that leads him away from a full discussion. "[N]othing I say," he
writes, "denies the possibility of linguistic sub-communities within the
community of English-speakers."21 But, he argues, "it is almost always the case that that technical language [of linguistic subcommunities] is parasitic on ordinary language" (p. 60 n.11). Finally, Schauer
envisages an extension of the "technical sub-community" idea to "the
possibility that every speech act environment is its own linguistic community" (p. 60) - that is, an extension to a completely individualistic
form.
I do not understand why the only relevant subcommunities are
those that use technical language. Perhaps Schauer believes that linguistic subcommunities cannot be constituted by social power because
they must use ordinary language to get the process of becoming a subcommunity going, and that social power can have no relevance to the
already constituted ordinary-language community of which the subcommunities are already parts. Yet, the point about linguistic communities that use technical language, which Schauer obviously
understands, is that their uses are initially parasitic upon ordinary language, but at some point split off.
Now consider two potential linguistic subcommunities: Susan's
and Sylvester's. Perhaps their language must be parasitic on ordinary
language in the same way, but I do not understand why that must be
so. If they are parasitic in different ways, as the subcommunities de20. Schauer addresses what he properly calls an implausible argument that "meaning is a
function of how an item oflanguage is used on a particular occasion by a particular speaker." P.
59. He says as well that it is another thing to argue that "the meaning of a word •.. is a function
of how it is used by the community of speakers of a language." P. 59. A few pages later he
discusses an important contemporary controversy among philosophers about how to understand
Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following. Pp. 65·68. The dispute as Schauer presents it con·
cems how "an unformulated or unformulatab/e rule" constrains; it does not concern "explaining
the potential constraint ofa formulated rule." P. 67. As so understood, the dispute is not one on
which Schauer must take a position. P. 65 n.23. Perhaps because I have misunderstood the
philosophers' debates about Wittgenstein (and because I find one side of the argument more
persuasive than the other), I think that Schauer does not confront the "social power" argument
head on.
21. P. 60 n.11; see also p. 58 n.8.
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velop their understanding of their own terms, the distance from ordinary language increases, but, more important for the present
argument, so does their distance from each other. Sylvester's probable
cause may be parasitic on ordinary language in one way, within a linguistic subcommunity of police officers, while Susan's is parasitic on
ordinary language in another way, within a different linguistic subcommunity.22 If Sylvester nonetheless acts in a manner consistent
with Susan's rule, Schauer has not eliminated - or, I am afraid, even
addressed - the possibility that it is social power, rather than the
rule's meaning, that constrains Sylvester. To capture my point in an
oversimplified phrase: for "playing by the rules" to be a coherent
practice, Sylvester must be different from Susan, but for rules to constrain because of their semantic autonomy, Sylvester must be part of
the same linguistic community as Susan.
Nothing in the nature of society makes it impossible for both parts
of that phrase to be true. Nor, however, does anything in the nature of
language make it necessary that they both be true. In short, Schauer's
analytic exercise makes sense of the practice of rule-following, but it
does not, because I believe it cannot, establish that rules constrain because of their semantic autonomy. I confess, though, that I do not
really understand why that is so important anyway.
Throughout the book Schauer illuminates a number of issues. For
example, he explains why a legal system, considered as a set of rules,
typically operates on the premises of "presumptive positivism" (pp.
202-06). Yet, as far as I can tell, little in Schauer's analysis of these
collateral issues turns on his particular view of the ruleness of rules;
nothing changes, as far as I can see, if we confine our attention to rules
considered as mere "rules of thumb." Presumptive positivism for
Schauer is "a way of describing a degree of strong but overridable priority," so that "decision-makers override a rule ... not when they
believe that the rule has produced an erroneous or suboptimal result in
this case ... but instead when, and only when, the reasons for overriding are perceived by the decision-maker to be particularly strong" (p.
204). But that also describes how an intelligent decisionmaker uses
rules of thumb. Rules of thumb have presumptive force when decisionmakers believe that they may be overlooking information that a
more intensive but more expensive search would reveal. They therefore lack sufficient confidence in their judgment that the result in the
case at hand is erroneous to override the rule of thumb, which encapsulates a range of experience with apparently similar cases.
Schauer's collateral arguments are interesting, but obviously more
important is his central point about the practice of rule-following. His
analysis there is instructive, and may well be correct as a conceptual
22. For example, Susan the judge may believe that probable means "more likely than not,"
while Sylvester the police officer may believe that it means "reasonably likely."
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analysis. As I have suggested, however, its practical implications are
less clear to me. Perhaps the analysis suggests that a police chief trying to develop a rule about car chases should consider whether she is
better than police officers at identifying and balancing the interests affected by car chases. Yet, as I have suggested, I am reasonably confident that any chief who put the issue of formulating such a rule on her
agenda would already have resolved that question. And, of course,
Schauer agrees that once a rule is in place, his analysis does not tell
anyone what to do with it.

